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The Greek military of the interwar period con­
stituted a major source of political instability. A 
profound transformation of the social make-up of 
the officer corps resulting from the Balkan Wars 
(1912-1913) and the subsequent politicisation of 
the officers due to the clash between Throne and 
Parliament, had a lasting impact on the conduct 
of Greek politics. Between 1916 and 1935 there 
were seven important military upheavals (1916, 
1922, 1923, 1925, 1926, 1933, 1935) including a 
dictatorship under General Pangalos1 (1925-1926) 
and countless incidents of pressure exerted on the 
government by individual officersor military cliques.
The indigenous anomalies that plagued par­
liamentary life between 1915 and 1926 and the 
rise of authoritarian ideology in Europe, contrib­
uted to the ebb of the fortunes of Democracy in 
Greece. Although the opposition against the 
Monarchy mounted after the Asia Minor catas­
trophe and the coup of 1923, republican fervour 
among the military was not combined with corre­
sponding respect for parliamentary Democracy. 
Such military strongmen of the Republic as Kon- 
dylis, Pangalos, Plastiras, Othonaios, etc., each 
savoured a personal version of authoritarian rule.2
From the end of 1922, «Dimokratia» with its 
double meaning of Democracy and Republic, had 
become a very inclusive term indeed. For Veni- 
zelist Liberals «Dimokratia» had been in fact se­
cured with the intervention of the army and the 
execution of the most prominent Royalist leaders 
in 1922. To the Republicans in the army between 
1923-1924, it signified the expulsion of the 
Monarchy and its clientele. Only to a few pro­
gressive intellectuals, adherents of the Republic, 
was the term associated with social reform.3 At­
titudes concerning its legitimacy varied, but mili­
tary anomalies following its foundation earned it 
the cynical scepticism of many Gneeks. Regard­
less of whether it was favourably inclined to it or 
not, the public was aware of its partisan charac­
ter. Friends were complacent, foes outraged. 
Terminating a brief interlude of cooperation be­
tween the major parties (1927), Venizelos’ return 
in active politics (1928) confirmed the impression 
that the Republic was associated with his party.
Between 1926-1933 the credibility of parliamen­
tary institutions was temporarily restored but the 
repercussions of economic recession in Europe
1. Biographical notes may be found in Appendix below.
2. S. Maximos, Parliament or Dictatorship? (Koinovoulio i 
dictatorial. Athens 1975. According to Maximos, parliamen­
tary democracy in Greece between 1922-26 alternated with 
dictatorship as different solutions for the preservation of the 
bourgeois system.·
3. A. Papanastasiou, Political Writings (Politika Kimena), 
Voi. A, Athens 1976, pp. 358, 383, 423.
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caused serious turbulence. Although it is true that 
Greek politics had been in the past conducted on 
a highly personalised level, devoid of sincere 
adherence to principles of ideology, the cynicism 
which prevailed in politics after 1933 was quite 
unprecedented.
In March 1935 a coalition of Republican offi­
cers and civilians sought to overthrow the govern­
ment of Panagis Tsaldaris (a moderate 
conservative) allegedly to avert an impending 
reinstatement of the Monarchy in Greece. Of the 
surviving participants in the coup of March 1935, 
interviewed between 1969 and 1971, not one ad­
mits to have favoured the idea of the insurrection 
at the time of its outbreak. Some claim to have 
been drawn into it unwittingly, others halfhear­
tedly, motivated by a sense of solidarity towards 
their comrades. Ex post facto denunciations are 
not uncommon in private retrospective accounts. 
What is interesting to note, however, is that Re­
publicans opposed to the coup chose to be so 
only on the practical grounds that the action was 
adjudged untimely. There are two things that 
make the sincerity of this opposition questionable:
a) In view of the favourable Republican position 
within the army and navy, rational forecasts gave 
the coup a good chance of success, b) Our obser­
vation that most of the Republican sense of out­
rage is directed against those who implemented 
the coup rather than against Eleftherios Ven- 
izelos, who gave the signal. Had the coup suc­
ceeded, sentiments might very well have been af­
firmative.
Be that as it may, we have yet to hear a single 
voice from the Republican camp raised against 
the idea of overthrowing by arms a popularly 
elected government in order to preserve the Re­
public. A general inability to abstract principles 
from their personal perception of their conven­
ience, accounts for the failure of interwar Repub­
licans to realise that they used the term 
«Dimokratia» in a very partial manner.
It would be necessary to note that a distinction 
between civilian and military conspirators would 
not clarify at all the nature of the opposition that 
existed between the different groupings that made 
up the loose Republican coalition responsible for 
the coup of 1935. A more useful distinction would 
be one between the different categories of the 
military that were implicated. There were roughly 
three such categories:
a) The group which played a lesser role in the 
outbreak of the coup, made up of older retired 
officers who somehow felt, like Nikolaos Plas- 
tiras1, that the mission of the officer does not
1. Plastiras: Venizelist retired officer who fled the country
cease with his career in the service. Generals 
Neokosmos Grigoriadis and Anastasios Papoulas, 
both members of the «Republican Defence», were 
two such cases.
b) Officers who had either been dismissed during 
the fall of dictator Theodoras Pangalos in 1926, 
like Napoleon Zervas and Andreas Kolialexis, or 
after the attempt of Plastiras to seize power in 
1933, like Leonidas Spais, Ilias Diamesis and Mil- 
tiadis Kimisis, who were primarily moved by 
their desire to reenter the ranks of the army or 
navy. These officers formed the radical clique in 
the «Republican Defence». Their obstinate faith 
in Plastiras and their impatience in pressing for 
action soon brought them at odds with
c) the ESO, «Elliniki Stratiotiki Organosis» 
(Greek Military Organisation), consisting up to 
1934 of junior officers, graduates of the Military 
Academy, with ambitious plans to reform the 
army into an elitist institution, independent of 
politics2.
Although the coup was initially conceived by 
Venizelist politicians as a preemptive measure 
against the Populist government, the active par­
ticipation of civilians in it was ultimately limited 
to Venizelos and a few of his close friends. Most 
of the politicians had made feeble attempts to di­
rect different military groupings and were either 
ignored by the officers or willingly dropped out at 
various stages of the organisation. An account of 
the civilian role in the coup is necessary at this 
point.
On 29 June 1933 Venizelos was greeted in 
Thessaloniki by an enthusiastic crowd demon­
strating against the government’s half-hearted ef­
forts to apprehend the criminals responsible for 
an attempt against his life.
On 3 July 1933, five prominent Liberals met at 
Alexandras Zannas’ house in Thessaloniki 
(Venizelos, Alexandras Mylonas, Alexandras 
Papanastasiou, Ioannis Sophianopoulos, Georgios
after failing to prevent the Populist leader, P. Tsaldaris, from 
assuming office on the next day of the elections (6 March 
1933). A number of his accomplices were dismissed from the 
army aqd navy.
T. Veremis, «Unpublished Documents Concerning the Coup of 
6 March 1933» (Anekdota keimena gyro apo to kinima tis 6 
Martiou 1933), Mnimon, Athens 1975, pp. 81-100.
2. Stephanos Saraphis,' who had dominated the ESO by 
March 1935, had a different view of the role of the military. 
He felt that the Armed Forces could direct policy from a dis­
tance, threatening politicians with strong measures if they 
failed to adhere to their wishes. His attachment to his patron, 
General Alexandras Othonaios, for whom he might have en­
visaged the Presidency of the Republic, brought him into di­
rect collision with Othonaios’ rival since 1927, Plastiras, and 
the «Republican Defence».
S. Saraphis, Memoirs (Istorikes Anamniseis), Voi. I, Athens 
1953, p. 385.
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Kaphandaris). During the meeting, Kaphandaris 
pointed out that the Republic had been seriously 
eroded by changes in the Army and the Police, 
effected by the Minister of Army Affairs, Geor- 
gios Kondylis. Fearing a forthcoming Royalist 
dictatorship, he moved for the formation of a 
military association to act as a safeguard for the 
Republic. Both Mylonas and Sophianopoulos 
agreed but Papanastasiou objected on the grounds 
that military organisations rarely retained their de­
fensive character and easily assumed the 
offensive.1 Kaphandaris’ proposition that Zannas 
should study the matter on behalf of the rest was 
finally accepted. -Venizelos left for France with 
the assurance that the organisation was under 
way,2 while fifteen days later, Kaphandaris, 
Papanastasiou, Zannas, Maris and Mylonas met at 
the latter’s house in Kifisia. Zannas was officially 
appointed president of the prospective military 
organisation and a liaison between officers and 
politicians was established. In spite of his own 
doubts, Zannas accepted the position of president 
on condition that a) total secrecy would be kept 
concerning the inner core of officers, b) he would 
be given complete freedom of activity, c) the Re­
publican politicians would actively support the 
effort.3
The first person initiated into the organisation 
by Zannas was an old hand in naval conspiracies, 
Captain Andreas Kolialexis. Although dismissed 
from the Navy after the fall of dictator Pangalos 
in 1926, he commanded respect among Republi­
can naval officers. Along with Saraphis (whom 
Zannas persuaded to join), Kolialexis and Zannas 
formed the first Revolutionary committee. The 
latter had in the meantime succeeded in bringing 
together Venizelos and Plastiras after a year of 
total estrangement. Plastiras, understandably, 
nursed a grudge against his old patron for having 
abandoned him while executing his coup of
1. G. Daphnis, Greece between the Two Wars (l Ellas 
metaxy Dyo Pôlemon), Vol. II, Athens 1955, p. 295.
S. Gonatas, Memoirs (Apomnimonevmata), Athens 1958, pp. 
357-358.
2. The Archive of Alexandras Zannas. The owner of the 
Archive wishes to remain unknown. Newspaper TO VIMA, 
25 January 1959, «The Fatal Coup which Caused Venizelos’ 
Death» (To Moiraion Kinima pou Efere ton Eleftherio Veni- 
zelo ston Tafo), by A. Zannas.
3. Interview with Mrs. Virginia Zannas, Kifisia, summer of 
1970.
Alexandras Zannas, Venizelos’ most respectable supporter in 
Thessaloniki had been one of the architects of the «National 
Defence» movement which instigated in 1916 a revolt against 
the position of the King vis-a-vis the commitment of Greece 
on the side of the Entente. He later became a successful 
Minister of Air in a cabinet under Venizelos.
E. Kavadias, The Naval War of 1940 (O Naftikos Polemos tou 
1940), Athens 1950, p. 36.
March 1933—a coup that Venizelos had initially 
given the impression of encouraging. Venizelos’ 
initiative in asking for a reconciliation did not fail 
to flatter his client into agreeing to cooperate.
Frequent rumours of a Kondylis-Metaxas dic­
tatorship were in the air from the beginning of 
1934 but, by July, the threat of an improvised up­
rising by the «Republican Defence» was far more 
serious. Plastiras, who had favoured such a coup, 
was reluctant to persuade the «Defence» to post­
pone the date of action but Venizelos finally con­
vinced him of the need for greater coordination. 
On 1 August 1934, an agreement was signed by 
Zannas, Venizelos and Plastiras. Reconciliation 
between the two pillars of the Republic brought 
no joy to the «Republican Defence» whose plans 
for an early coup were foiled. The Revolutionary 
Committee, however, was reshaped to admit the 
representative of the «Defence», retired General 
Prassos Vlachos.4
Periclis Argyropoulos was the foremost political 
adviser of the «Republican Defence». In his 
memoirs he claimed to have originated the idea of 
preemptive action against the Populist government 
after the attempt on Venizelos—a suggestion 
which the latter had not overruled. His insistence 
on precisely that strategy throughout 1934 caused 
much discord and confusion in the Republican 
camp. Zannas, whom he accused of authoritarian 
tendencies and of satisfying personal ambitions, 
became his primary target from the outset. He 
also accused him of trying to persuade Venizelos 
to assume the leadership of the coup, thus endan­
gering the latter’s prestige in case of failure.5 
The allegation is not altogether sound because, 
besides Zannas’ testimony to the contrary, the 
latter’s mother-in-law, that distinguished lady of 
Venizelism, Mrs. Penelope Delta, had repeatedly 
appealed to Venizelos to abstain from official 
leadership of the conspiracy. Either because he 
had approached their rival organisation of officers 
on active duty or because they suspected him of 
aiming at the leadership of the coup, the 
«Republican Defence» began to slander Zannas to 
Plastiras.
Exasperated by the slanderous attitude of the 
«Defence», Zannas decided to resign from the or­
ganisation of the coup. His final break with Ar­
gyropoulos came about when it became apparent 
that the latter had been preparing an uprising 
without previously consulting the Revolutionary
4. Newspaper TO VIMA, 27 January 1959, p. 1. Article by 
A. Zannas. The Archive of Zannas.
5. Interview with Mrs. Marie Argyropoulos, Athens, Oc­
tober 1970.
P. Argyropoulos, Memoirs (Apomnimonevmata), Vol. I, 
Athens 1970, pp. 478-480.
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Committee.1 Argyropoulos, who was hoping to 
force the hand of officers on active duty to turn 
against the government, accused Zannas and 
Saraphis of foiling his plans. Saraphis, whom he 
considered a friend of Othonaios and hence op­
posed to Plastiras, he accused of using Venizelos’ 
prestige in order to manipulate the views of offi­
cers on active duty.2
In August 1934 Venizelos wrote the following 
letter to Gonatas:
...our friend Mr. Zannas will bring you minutes of the agree­
ment concluded with General Plastiras after long discussions 
through which we hope to avoid isolated and hasty uprisings 
by impatient Republican elements. Choosing you was impera­
tive after the overt enmity of the recalcitrant Republicans 
against Mr. Zannas. There is no other person who combines 
the common trust of myself and the Leader (Plastiras). 3
It was through the enclosed minutes of the 
agreement that Gonatas discovered he had al­
ready been chosen to replace Zannas. 4
Whithout bothering to consult him, Venizelos had 
decided that Gonatas would be the president of the 
Revolutionary Committee. Gonatas complained in 
his Memoirs that:
...neither Vlachos nor Saraphis ever appeared to me and the 
signatories of the agreement (Venizelos-Plastiras) kept corre­
1. The Archive of Zannas. Daphnis, Vol. II, p. 284.
2. Argyropoulos, p. 480.
3. Gonatas, pp. 365-366.
4. Gonatas, pp.366-367. Eleftherios Venizelos - Nikolaos 
Plastiras
Mr. Zannas had informed us that impatient officers who had 
been dismissed from the Army owing to the events of 6 
March 1933, had decided to stage a coup on a specific day. 
The operation was postponed because the units of Northern 
Greece and officers in Athens were informed by Mr. Zannas 
that Venizelos disapproved of the movement. To avoid similar 
isolated Republican activities which may lead to disaster the 
following decisions were reached: 1) The formation of a 
three-member committee consisting of Capt. Kolialexis, Col.
Saraphis and Gonatas—who will be its president and without 
whose opinion no military action will be taken. 2) Efforts to 
reach an understanding with the government on the following 
points: Reelection of Zaimis (President of the Republic), re­
turn to the electoral system of proportional representation and 
general amnesty for members of the coup of 1933. Once the 
system of proportional representation is established Venizelos 
will not run for office again... 3) If the Government refuses 
the plea of the Senate for a joint, session and attempts a sec­
ond voting of its electoral bill only by parliament, the parties 
of the «National Coalition» will pursue the organisation of 
demonstrations to protest against the infringement of their 
rights and will demand that the unconstitutional bill be dis­
carded by the President of the Republic... if all the above are 
not taken into consideration and the government conducts 
elections with the unconstitutional electoral system, then the 
opposition will abstain and will protect the (Republican) sys­
tem in accordance with the final article of the Constitution, 
pursuing the fall of the government through any means, in­
cluding force.
sponding and coming in contact directly with various revolu­
tionary elements. 5
Saraphis contradicted Gonatas in his own 
Memoirs, stating that he had consulted him on 
several occasions but that Gonatas had been 
indecisive.6 Reluctant to involve himself directly 
but too timid to refuse Venizelos, Gonatas tried 
on several occasions to dissuade his leader from 
carrying out the coup. Unfortunately Venizelos 
had already been bound by a framework of com­
mitments which even he could not control. Zan­
nas’ removal from the Revolutionary Committee 
plagued the organisation of the coup with lack of 
efficient coordination.
Venizelos’ conviction that the Republican offi­
cers were still the servants of his political designs 
was, by 1935, somewhat outdated. His flight to 
Crete after friction with members of the govern­
ment in Parliament, had deprived him of a clear 
view of budding military associations. Although 
old allies such as General Othonaios, were still 
active in the army, it was the General’s staff- 
officer Colonel Saraphis who aimed at the leader­
ship of an organisation made up of junior officers. 
Contrary to what Venizelos may have thought, 
the members of the ESO (Greek Military 
Organisation) had no intention of facilitating the 
return of officers who had been dismissed for col­
laborating with Plastiras in his attempt of 1933. 
Between the members of the ESO and the dis­
missed officers of the «Republican Defence» there 
was no point of agreement other than their gen­
eral desire to overthrow the Populist government. 
A serious gap separated officers of the Plastiras 
type, who had little formal military education, 
and the more sophisticated Military Academy 
graduates of the ESO. Venizelos failed to realise 
the incompatibility of the goals of the two groups. 
It was this very rivalry among hypothetical allies 
that undermined his coup of 1935.
The origins of the ESO can be placed sometime 
in early 1932 when Venizelos was raising the 
threat of military intervention against his 
Populist opponents. With General Othonaios or­
ganising a clandestine «Military League», insub­
ordination had again become rampant. Younger 
officers such as Lieutenants Nikolaos Skanavis 
and Markos Kladakis, although Venizelists, were 
indignant about the way political patrons were 
corrupting the professional ethos of the officers 
and were shaping them into the familiar 
«condottieri» of the twenties (Loufas, 
Karakoufas, Dertilis, and others). By 1932, the
5. Gonatas, p. 366.
6. Saraphis, p. 347.
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percentage of Military Academy graduates among 
junior officers had risen. Graduates from 
«Evelpidon» with a pronounced degree of profes­
sional pride constituted a separate caste within 
the army. They read literature and psychology, 
discussed international affairs and looked down 
on their seniors who had risen from the ranks. 
Education was at a higher premium than reckless 
valour and the independence of the army from 
politics their most treasured goal.1
.Late in 1932 Lieutenant Nikolaos Skanavis, 
leader of the class of 1922, met with Lieutenant 
Georgios Kostopoulos to discuss the formation of 
an association between junior graduates of the 
Military Academy. The need for such an associa­
tion was"- based on the following reasons: 1) 
Grievances of remaining in the same rank indefi­
nitely. All members of the class of 1922 were in 
1932 still Lieutenants. On this issue they reiter­
ated the relevance of the pronunciamento of 1909. 
Retirement of officers who had been kept in the 
armed forces more than the time limit was neces­
sary. 2) Officers who had been in the past as­
sociated with political action and whose presence 
therefore caused controversy, should also be re­
tired. Political bigotry, they felt, had divided the 
army and made it a prey to aspiring politicians. 3) 
No important purchase of arms had been effected 
since 1925.2
Yannis Tsigantes, leader of the class of 1920, 
was the first Captain to be initiated into the ESO. 
He was a dashing young man of thirty five with 
an air of self-assurance which perhaps betrayed 
his upper .middle class background from Rumania. 
In 1929, he had published a military manual with 
far greater pretensions than any army literature 
up to date.3 It was a mixture of Logic, Psychol­
ogy, Sociology and Biology and had the unusual 
feature of containing very few subjects of military 
concern. He began the book with a statement that 
the army had been the foremost school for 
Democracy and went on to say that officers were 
entrusted with the task of transmitting national 
ideals as well as military training. There are chap­
ters that deal with «Reasons for Human 
Psychological Differences», «The Relationship be­
tween Psychology and Physiology» and a note in 
the bibliography that the author had consulted 500 
documents before attempting to write his manual.
1. We have reached that conclusion after examining the at­
titude of 50 Academy graduates of that period.
2. Interviews with Christ. Tsigantes, London, June 1970 
and Athens, August 1970, Nikolaos Skanavis, Athens, August 
1970, Markos Kladakis, Athens, December 1970, September 
1971 and October 1972.
3. Y. Tsigantes, The System of Training (1 Methodos
Ekpedefseos), Athens 1929.
This extravagant undertaking might give a good 
idea of the confusion that reigned in the minds of 
those who provided ESO with ideological direc­
tives. With his mixture of contemporary know­
how and worldly arrogance, Yannis Tsigantes 
had become a model of the modern officer and 
probably the most prominent member of the 
ESO.
The founders of the association consisted 
mainly of Venizelist officers from the class of 
1922 who made it a provision of the charter that 
membership was limited to Republican junior of­
ficers possessing no higher than a Captain’s rank. 
Being a gratuate of Evelpidon was not explicitly 
mentioned but was in fact a requirement for ad­
mission until 1933. The original charter did not 
provide for a leader and the position of the 
Chairman rotated among its members. Meetings 
were called whenever a member thought it was 
necessary. Its loose organisation failed to protect 
the ESO from ambitious strongmen and impeded 
its original aspiration for a system of democratic 
participation.
In 1933, Kladakis who was in favour of larger 
membership suggested that the political position 
of officers should not be considered among the 
prerequisites for admission. The majority of 
members of the ESO agreed and the provision for 
«confirmed Republicanism» gave way to accep­
tance «regardless of political conviction». (Kosto­
poulos disagreed and left the organisation.) An al­
liance took place between officers of different par­
ty loyalties who joined forces to promote their oc­
cupational interests. Concern over promotion 
had temporarily convinced members of the ESO 
that political conflict did not serve their aims. 
Therefore, all junior officers who shared a vague 
notion of reform coupled with a very precise 
desire to see some of their seniors go, were wel­
come.4 It was however a brief honeymoon. In 
February 1933, shortly before Plastiras’ coup in 
March, the leaders of the classes of 1920, 1921 
and 1922 met to discuss the introduction of a 
clause in the charter requiring members to accepl 
the Republican system regardless of party prefer­
ences. The Populist party had already recognised 
the Republic but some of its supporters in the 
army had preferred to harbour their Royalist sen­
timents and leave the ESO. The leader of the 
class of 1921, Captain Ketseas, was the first to 
go.
The leader of each class was the cadet with the
4. Markos Kladakis’ private papers. Interview with 
Athanasios Tountas, Athens 1970.
L. Spais, Fifty Years a Soldier (Peninta Chronia Stratiotis) 
Athens 1970, p. 206.
120
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 20/02/2020 22:58:28 |
the significance of the forces behind the organisation of the March 1935 coup
highest overall average in lessons, conduct and 
personality. (It is not clear how personality was 
measured.) He was responsible for every collec­
tive activity of his class and, in some cases, even 
for the individual conduct of his classmates. Class 
leaders enjoyed considerable prestige and benefits 
throughout their career because the seniority of 
officers was not only determined by their year of 
graduation but also their rank within their own 
class. Nevertheless, we have noticed that, with 
few exceptions,1 there had been no correlation 
between academic rank and subsequent achieve­
ment (or notoriety) in the army.
The ESO was opposed to Plastiras’ coup of 
March 1933. The Tsigantes brothers along with 
many young Venizelist officers had signed a pro­
tocol denouncing the attempt.2 Whether they 
were against Plastiras or the coup is not clear; 
what seems certain however is that the coup had 
been executed by officers of the variety that the 
ESO would have been very glad to get rid of. 
General Kimisis had persuaded Colonels 
Diamesis, Spais and Bizanis to join. Diamesis was 
known as the «prince of the Republic» because of 
his intense concern for its welfare, and L.S. as 
the «midwife» for his constant involvement in 
military politics.3 None of them were Academy 
graduates.
Plastiras’ abortive coup was followed by the 
dismissal of 40 officers suspected of complicity. 
From that point up to the outbreak of the March 
coup of 1935, these officers constantly conspired 
against the government. After the attempt on Veni- 
zelos’ life, they joined the «Republican Defence» 
—the arch-rival of the ESO—and were sarcastical­
ly termed by Venizelists the «viastiki», short for 
«those in a hurry to regain their position».
In 1934, the Minister of Army Affairs, Kon- 
dylis, raised the question of reforming the existing 
seniority in the Army list. Officers who had 
joined Venizelos on the side of the Entente in 
1916 had been rewarded with a bonus of ten 
months added to their seniority standing. Those 
who had chosen to remain in their posts in 
Athens therefore found themselves overtaken in 
seniority by some of their juniors.4 The ESO 
agreed that the ten months bonus be set aside but 
that the principle of promotion in the field of ac­
tion should remain. The ESO had obviously no­
1. Pangalos, who had been the leader of the class of 1918, 
was such an exception.
2. Information by Christ. Tsigantes.
3. Information by Plastiras’ adjutant Col. Mihalis Miniou- 
dakis, December 1971.
4. Daphnis, vol. II, pp. 259-258. L. Paraskevopoultjs,
frfemoirs (Anamniseis), Voi. I, p. 310.
thing to lose by Kondylis’ proposed change since 
its oldest members had graduated from the Mili­
tary Academy in 1920. On the contrary Major Al- 
kimos Bourdaras, a member of the «National 
Defence» of 1916, had much to lose by the re­
form and was preparing his own private coup 
against the government. Yannis Tsigantes im­
mediately suggested cooperation with Bourdaras 
but was overruled by most officers, including 
Kladakis and Skanavis. The idea of conspiring 
simply because Bourdaras’ seniority was at stake 
did not appeal to anyone except for Tsigantes 
who thought it opportune to annex his organisa­
tion. The possible benefit did not seem to be 
worth all the deceit involved and Tsigantes’ pres­
tige suffered a setback.5
In February 1934 Yannis Tsigantes proposed 
amending the charter in favour of admitting senior 
officers. In spite of initial reaction against the 
proposition, the decision was adopted, at the ex­
pense of the organisation’s homogeneity. Along 
with the elitist junior officers of the Military 
Academy came officers with little formal military 
education and very specific political commitments 
based on past activities. The association, was 
henceforth marked by the very characteristic it 
was set up to oppose: allegiance to a civilian pa­
tron, in this instance, Venizelos. Kladakis com­
plained that Tsigantes had often kept the ESO un­
informed about activities he was carrying out 
while wrongly posing as the leader of the organi­
sation. His practice of taking unauthorised initia­
tives was furthered by Saraphis who in turn 
claimed to be in charge. As a result of this influx 
of middle ranking officers, the founders of ESO 
were increasingly ignored as a decision-making 
body and the principles of their charter were ig­
nored and contradicted.6
Intensive recruitment of new members was car 
ried out throughout 1934 by most ESO members. 
Yannis Tsigantes had come into contact with 
Saraphis and Kladakis initiated Colonel Spyros 
Giorgoulis into the organisation.7 The reason for 
such urgency was a report given to Saraphis by 
Othonaios that the latter had been approached by
5. Markos Kladakis’ private papers.
6. Interview with Christ. Tsigantes, London, June 1970.
7. Officers initiated had to sign a protocol of «honour»: 
«Faithful to our oath to defend our country and the Republi­
can regime, we, the undersigned, assume the responsibility 
upon our word of military honour... to resist any attempt at 
establishing a dictatorship or the Monarchy or any threat 
against the existing Republican constitution. Keeping secret 
the content of the present document is also a question of hon­
our for us.»
This particular copy in the possession of General A. T. is 
dated 24 April 1934 and bears the signatures of fifteen mem­
bers.
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an agent of Kondylis and asked if he was in­
terested in participating in a dictatorial triumvi­
rate.
The «Republican Defence» on the other hand 
was officially authorised in 1932 as an association 
of retired officers and elderly civilians with strong 
feelings that the Republic should be preserved. Its 
first president was a leading officer in Venizelos’ 
secessionist army of Thessaloniki in 1916 and 
later Senator of the Republic, Neokosmos Grigo- 
riadis. After Plastiras’ coup and the attempt against 
Venizelos, the character of the «Republican 
Defence» changed from a social gathering of 
senior citizens into a centre of belligerent propa­
ganda and conspiratorial activity. Its ranks were 
revitalised by the entry of dismissed officers from 
the coup of March 1933. Its renaming as «Panhellenic 
Republican Defence» was meant to emphasise 
its nation-wide appeal and following.
In May 1934 the presidency of the organisation 
was assumed by the ex-anti-Venizelist commander 
of the Greek forces in Asia Minor, Anastasios 
Papoulas. A phenomenon of complete change of 
heart matched only by Kondylis and Admiral 
Hadjikyriakos,1 Papoulas had been totally re­
habilitated from his Royalist past. During the tri­
als of the Gounaris government in 1922, he had 
appeared as a witness for the prosecution, an act 
which earned him the everlasting hatred of the 
anti-Venizelist world. His subsequent volte-face 
might very well have been an effort to protect 
himself from his ex-colleagues’ revenge.
Towards the end of 1933, Papoulas launched a 
journalistic onslaught against the government. His 
article in the first edition of the daily «Republican 
Struggle» (11 October 1933), began as follows: 
«The reinstatement of the Monarchy can only 
bring disaster and destruction». Towards the end 
of the article he appeals for a socialist regime:
...we have to understand that the countries of the world are 
going through a crisis and that since the war people have been 
trying to shape their regimes into Republics with a social con­
text rather than adhering to a collection of dead articles in the 
hands of an oligarchy of capitalists.
Two weeks later, in an article in the same news­
paper, he drew the public’s attention to Kondylis’ 
effort to change the Army List.
The well known plan for changing the republican composition 
of the army has been discussed in the Senate. It is imperative 
that all Republican leaders and all the Republican people 
should remain on the alert. The Republican officers should be
1. Both fanatical exponents of the Republic in 1924, joined
the anti-Venizelist camp in 1932 as members of a Tsaldaris
cabinet.
ready to defend our Republican regime... These officers who 
bear the great honour of playing the most important part in 
establishing the Republic should be aware, and they are 
aware, that with them lies the responsibility for protecting the 
Republic... The Republican officers have written with their 
struggles one of the most brilliant pages of contemporary 
Greek history. This history they must brighten with new 
struggles. We should not forget that during the hundred years 
of our independence the Army has played a very important 
role for the démocratisation of our political regime (1843, 
1863, 1909). In 1922 the Republican officers mitigated the Asia 
Minor disaster... The Greek officers in their large majority be­
long to the working people... that is why now the people and 
the Army will defend the Republic and will then march to­
gether towards new social struggles...2
Most of the newspaper was dominated by pic­
tures of Plastiras, who was generally considered 
as the leader of the «Republican Defence» in ab­
sentia. A reply to the «Republican Struggle» was 
the pro-government «Popular Struggle» with arti­
cles even surpassing its rival in fanaticism:
Greece will never rest until the miserable old man from 
Halepa (Venizelos) is led like a common criminal to the gal­
lows or to the mad-house.3
Venizelos himself tried to keep Papoulas in line:
...You have to try and avoid all misunderstanding about your 
organisation. Make it clear so that everyone will understand... 
that your organisation has no other purpose except the de­
fence of the Republic, if endangered. The government may 
remain in power as long as parliament supports it. Under 
these terms I will declare that 1 agree and give my blessing to 
the «Panhellenic Republican Defence»...4
The «National Republican Sentinel of Northern 
Greece» was founded in August 1933 in Thes­
saloniki and its charter was approved by a court 
on 11 November 1933. The stated reasons for its 
foundation were the following: a) the Senate was 
threatened with extinction, b) distinguished mem­
bers of the Populist party had formed Royalist 
clubs with the sole purpose of restoring the 
Monarchy, c) the most dangerous of these organi­
sations, the «National Political Association», was 
blessed by the government itself, d) members of 
the said organisation paraded in central streets in 
Athens accompanied by a naval band, e) two 
ministers were present in one of the organisa­
tion’s rallies applauding Royalist slogans, f) minis­
ters threatened to exile directors of Republican 
clubs, g) unconstitutional laws were put into ef­
fect that threatened the position of Republican of­
ficers in the army, h) there was also the attempt 
against the life of Venizelos.5
2. Newspaper Dimokratikos Agon, 25 October 1933.
3. Newspaper Laikos Agon, 13 December 1933.
4. Y. Benekòs, The Coup of 1935 (To Kinima tou 1935), 
Athens 1958. p. 70.
5. Ibid., p. 71.
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Papoulas established close ties with the 
«National Republican Sentinel of Northern 
Greece» which became a branch of the «Repub­
lican Defence». In a solemn ceremony in Thessa­
loniki, he made a clear insinuation about the in­
tentions of the «Defence» while presenting the or­
ganisation with a Greek flag, pointing out that 
«this is a battle standard, not something you hang 
outside a club».1 In spite of the second arti­
cle of its statute stating its intent to observe the 
law, the organisation had already tasted the suc­
cess of unauthorised activity. On 25 October 1934 
armed members of the «Defence» had ap­
prehended the bandit Karathanasis, who was 
hired to kill Venizelos, and gave him up to the 
police. Although Karathanasis was a wanted man, 
government newspapers protested strongly against 
the arbitrary action of the «Republican De­
fence».2
As a result of the alarm caused by the election 
of Kotzias, a Royalist, as Mayor of Athens, offi­
cers on active duty gathered at Lt. Col. Christ. 
Tsigantes' home to decide the battle formation of 
the ESO. A staff was organised along the lines of 
the official military model, without deciding how­
ever on a chief of that staff. The 1st Bureau was 
responsible for organisation and command and 
would be directed by Lt. Col. Giorgoulis with the 
assistance of Lt. Col. Hondros. The 2nd Bureau 
would deal with information and intelligence 
headed by Col. Petros Grigorakis and Lt. Col. 
Christ. Tsigantes. The 3rd Bureau was concerned 
with operations and communications and was the 
responsibility of Col. Saraphis. Captain Yannis 
Tsigantes would act as general coordinator of all 
three Bureaus. Representative of the organisation 
in Thessaloniki: Major Sfetsios, Serres: Lt. Col. 
Hondros, Veria: Lt. Col. Psarros.
The introduction of high ranking officers into 
the ESO all but erased the influence of the found­
ing junior officers. Their last independent activity 
was the planning of a coup in the spring of 1934. 
General Delagrammatis, Director of the Military 
Academy, however, exerted his influence and 
managed to avert the uprising.3
The «Republican Defence» meanwhile observed 
with dismay the growing influence of Saraphis 
over Venizelos. Advised by Zannas, the latter 
was increasingly favouring the more useful offi­
cers on active duty to the powerless dismissed of­
ficers. When Diamesis accused Saraphis of trying 
to prevent dismissed officers from returning to 
the army, the latter replied rather vaguely that,
1. Benekos, p. 74.
2. Magazine Epikaira, 30 January 1970, pp. 62-63, 72.
3. Kladakis’ private papers. Saraphis, p. 341.
for reasons of security, more than one organisa­
tion was necessary. According to Kladakis, 
Saraphis had purposely exaggerated the numbers 
of the ESO to Venizelos. By claiming that there 
were 1,400 members compared to the actual 244 
(90% of whom were staff officers), he made the 
feasibility of a coup seem much greater. What he 
wanted was the prestigious blessing of a patron of 
Venizelos’ calibre and, simultaneously, to prevent 
the «Republican Defence» from playing any seri­
ous role in a prospective operation against the 
government.4
In July 1934, Saraphis was informed by the 
Athens Garrison that Diamesis was planning to 
launch a coup with Zervas (the military adven­
turist of the Pangalos dictatorship who had been 
dismissed from the army in 1927).
...1 sent a message that no one was to move and that they 
(officers friendly to Diamesis and Zervas) would only obey 
orders coming from officers on active duty. I informed Zannas 
of the events and went to Kifissia to inform George Ventiris 
and General Skandalis that it was necessary to summon 
Papanastasiou, Kaphandaris et al. to exert all their influence 
to prevent such a foolish action. At the same time, I informed 
them (Diamesis, Zervas) directly that not only did I disagree... 
but that I would join their opponents to save the Republican 
officers from the consequences of their failure.5
It is interesting to note that politicians still pos­
sessed such influence over the military as to dis­
suade them from carrying out their decision to 
rise.
When word came that the coup had been ap­
proved and blessed by Plastiras (Papathanasopou- 
los told Saraphis this), Zannas decided to go to 
France and attempt a reconciliation between the 
latter and Venizelos in order to secure effective 
coordination of any future activities. The pos­
itive result of that effort has already been dis­
cussed.
In August 1934 Venizelos invited members of 
the ESO to Crete. The Cretan statesman pointed 
out the danger of restoration of the Monarchy to 
Saraphis, Giorgoulis and Christ. Tsigantes and 
urged them to act along the same lines as the of­
ficers of the pronunciamento of 1909.6 Saraphis 
replied that if circumstances led to a revolution, 
they would like to have Venizelos as their leader 
but without the company of councilors such as 
Maris and Vourloumis, who had brought disre-
4. Interview with Marcos Kladakis, Athens, November 
1971.
5. Saraphis, p. 345.
6. Venizelos hoped that the military would limit their in­
tervention to an overthrow of the existing government and 
that he would be subsequently summoned to step in.
The Archive of Plastiras.
Interview with Spyros Giorgoulis, October 1972.
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pute on the Republican camp. It was the first 
time that a military protégé of Venizelos dared 
set conditions to his patron. The significance of 
the incident unfortunately escaped the old states­
man who, since the meeting of July 1933, main­
tained the illusion that the army was faithful to 
his biddings.1
Unwittingly, the ESO helped to diminish the 
prestige of the Venizelist political leadership but 
otherwise achieved little as an organisation. The 
aspirations of its founders to give it a corporate 
structure by emphasizing criteria of professional 
merit rather than relations of patronage, came 
into conflict with the prevailing system of clien­
tage. The ESO had therefore been condemned by 
the very pretensions of its founding charter. Since 
most articles were contrary to the traditional op­
eration of clientage networks, the charter fell in 
disuse while such active members as Saraphis and
1. Saraphis, pp. 346-347.
Yannis Tsigantes assumed the initiative of recruit­
ing allies on the basis of their personal grievances 
and ambitions. Principles, therefore, such as a 
clear separation between civilian and military au­
thority, professional integrity and meritocracy, 
were replaced by personal criteria.
The subsequent failure of the coup of March 
1935 has been attributed to a variety of reasons 
the most vital of which appear to be the follow­
ing: I) Undertakings on such a large scale re­
quired the kind of formal organization which was 
impossible to sustain. Given the competitiveness 
between factions on all levels of Greek society, 
Venizelos ought not to have delegated authority 
to so many participants. II) The absence of strong 
ideological grounds among the various groups in­
volved was thinly disguised by a common Repub­
lican position. Diversity of aims and motives 
hammered cooperation and impaired the outcome 
of the uprising. The restoration of George II, 
which came about partly as a consequence of a 
purge of Venizelist officers following the coup, 
had a lasting impact on subsequent Greek affairs.
APPENDIX
Argyropoulos, Pendis (1881-1966). Bom in Athens, Prefect of 
Larissa (1910) and of Thessaloniki (1912). A leading figure in 
the Thessaloniki revolt of 1916. Governor General of 
Macedonia (1917-1918). With Kondylis, A. inspired the Veni­
zelist «Amyna» movement in Constantinople (1921-1922). He 
stood by the «Republican Defence» during the coup of 1935.
King George II (1890-1948). Son of King Constantine and 
Queen Sophia. Graduated from the Military Academy in 1909 
and furthered his military studies in Berlin. He followed his 
father into exile in 1917 because the Entente forces chose his 
younger brother Alexander to become King. He returned to 
Greece with his father in 1920 and became King in 1922 after 
Constantine was exiled once more. In 1923 he was forced to 
leave Greece being accused of complicity in the abortive coup 
of November of that year. The Republic was officially pro­
claimed in 1924 and his return to Greece was thereafter pro­
hibited. Following the coup of 1935 he was recalled to the 
throne after a plebiscite of dubious legitimacy.
Giorgoulis, Spyros (1890-1974). Bom in Kalamata. Although 
he did not study in the Academy he belonged to the group of 
educated officers having graduated from the Law School. A 
Venizelist of the less intransigent variety he left the organisa­
tion of the coup of 1935 before its outbreak and was one of 
the few to escape the subsequent purge.
Gonatas, Stylianos (1876-196^ . Bom in Patras of middle class 
parents. Studied in the Military Academy and entered the In­
fantry Corps. Took part in the war of 1897 and the Balkan 
Wars (1912-1913). Became Chief of Staff of the First Army 
Corps in Asia Minor and was promoted to Divisional Com­
mander during the summer of 1922. Although Gonatas was 
known for his neutralist position during the «dichasmos», he 
was called to lead, along with Venizelist Plastiras, the Rev­
olutionary Committee of 1922 which forced King Constantine 
to abdicate, and executed six Royalist Ministers. He became 
Prime Minister in the military dictatorship of 1922 until 1924 
when he left the army. In 1929 he was elected Senator and 
remained an agent of Venizelism in politics. His implication in 
the coup of 1935 was marginal.
Grigoriadis, Neokosmos (1897-1967). Bom in Constantinople. 
He rose from the ranks and took part in all Greek campaigns 
between 1897 and 1922. A Venizelist with a strong political 
position, he took part in the revolt of 1916 and in the trial of 
the Royalist Ministers in 1922. He retired in 1923 with the 
rank of Major General and entered politics initially as a Lib­
eral Nationalist and later as a Socialist.
Hadjikyriakos, Alexandres (1874-1958). Bora on the island of 
Syros of prosperous parents. Took active part in the pronun­
ciamento of 1909 and the revolt of 1916. He was dismissed
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from the navy in 1920 because of his strong Venizelist posi­
tion and was readmitted by the Revolution of 1922 as its rep­
resentative in the navy. His political influence in that service 
was dominant for at least a decade. His volatile and unpre­
dictable temper made him many enemies on both political 
camps. Lacking the aptitude for parliamentary politics like 
Kondylis, he sought to maintain his influence by shifting al­
legiances from the Venizelist camp to the Populist party in 
1932. The coup of 1935 took him by surprise as Minister for 
the Navy.
Kaphandaris, Geotgios (1873-1946). Bom in a village of Ev- 
rytania he studied law in Athens and practiced in Messolonghi 
and later in Athens. Deputy in 1905. Although a supporter of 
progressive measures, he disavowed the pronunciamento of 
1909 and abstained from the elections of October 1910. Later 
he made peace with Venizelos and held ministerial positions in 
most of his governments. In 1923 he emerged as the politician 
most likely to replace Venizelos in the Liberal party. He be­
came a Minister in January 1924 and Prime Minister after 
Venizelos resigned in February 1924. He too resigned due to 
military pressure on 12 March 1924, and formed the Progres­
sive Liberal party. After the fall of Pangalos he played an im­
portant part in the «Ikoumeniki» government in which he held 
the Ministry of Finance. Venizelos’ return to active politics 
caused a rift between the two.
Karavidas, Ioannis (1891- ). Bom in Nafpaktos, graduated
from the Naval Academy in 1911 and studied in England. He 
was dismissed from the navy in 1935 because of his Venizelist 
position.
Kimisis, Miltiadis (1878-1935). Born in Amfilochia. Fought in 
the Balkan Wars and in Asia Minor. Member of the Rev­
olutionary Committee of 1922. Was dismissed in 1933 after 
the PI as tiras’ coup. Although his actual role in the coup of 
1935 was minimal, he was executed for being a member of the 
«Republican Defence».
Kladakis, Markos (1900-1973). Bom in Symi, an island of the 
Dodecanese, into a respectable middle class family. His father 
was a lawyer and Mayor of the island. He graduated from the 
Military Academy in 1922 and joined the Republican clique of 
his class. In 1932 he began organising ESO with the aid of 
classmates Skanavis and Kostopoulos. His foremost aspiration 
was to clean the army from officers who had not graduated 
from the Academy and whose non-professional conduct 
brought shame to the service. He was dismissed from the 
army after the failure of the coup of 1935. He claimed that he 
had been opposed to the coup because he objected to. the of­
ficers in charge, especially Saraphis.
Kolialexis, Andreas (1884-1953). Bom in Syros. Graduated 
from the Naval Academy and studied in Portsmouth, England. 
A devoted Venizelist, he became Commander in Chief of the 
fleet in 1926 and was dismissed after the fall of Pangalos for 
having aided him in his dictatorship. He participated in the 
coup of 1935.
Kondylis, Georgios (1878-1936). Bom in Roumeli, he joined 
the infantry as a volunteer in 1896 rising from the ranks. In 
1897 he was in Crete and between 1904 and 1908 fought as a 
guerrila in Macedonia and then in Thrace. Served in the Bal­
kan Wars and in the army that was made up by the «National 
Defence» of Thessaloniki in 1916. Served in the Ukraine in 
1918-19, and in Asia Minor as a Colonel in 1919-20. From 
November 1920 until September 1922, he promoted the anti- 
Royalist cause as a fugitive in Constantinople. In 1923 he was 
instrumental in putting down the Gargalidis-Leonardopoulos 
coup. He retired from the army in that year and became
deeply involved in politics. He changed political camps in 
1931, moving from extreme Republicanism to a Royalist posi­
tion. As Minister of Army Affairs he crushed the coup of 1935 
and subsequently restored the Monarchy.
Othonaios, Alexandres (1879-1970). Bom in Gythion, Laconia, 
he belonged to a middle class family. His father was a civil 
servant who had married twice and had 9 sons and 5 daugh­
ters. Othonaios abandoned his first year of law studies to 
enter the Military Academy at the same time as Pangalos, 
Tsimikalis, K. Manetas, Tseroulis and other future prominent 
figures of the army. The 13 graduates of the class of 1900 
were compelled by regulations to enter the infantry because of 
the shortage of officers in that corps. He took part in the 
Macedonian struggle, the Balkan Wars, the «National 
Defence» of Thessaloniki and was wounded in Asia Minor. He 
became one of the youngest Lt. Generals and remained a lead­
ing figure in the conspiratorial «Military League» until its dis­
solution in 1932. During the coup of 1935 he chose to sit on 
the fence and wait for the outcome. He was sacked after the 
failure of the coup.
Pangalos, Theodoras (1878-1952). Studied at the Military 
Academy and in Paris. He was a leading member of the 
«Military League» of 1909. In 1916 he joined the revolt in 
Thessaloniki. In 1917 he was appointed Chief of the Personnel 
Department at the Ministry of Army Affairs. In 1918-20 he 
was Chief of Staff to Paraskevopoulos’ GHQ in Macedonia 
and in Asia Minor. An ambitious and able political General, 
he engineered the trial of the six Royalist Ministers and be­
came dictator in 1925. He was overthrown by Kondylis, Zer- 
vas and Dertilis and was imprisoned.
Papagos, Alexandras (1883-1955). Bom in Athens into a prom­
inent Royalist family. Studied in the Brussels Academy and 
joined the cavalry in 1906. He stood by the Monarchy 
throughout its long controversy with Venizelos. He was dis­
missed from the army in 1917. In 1921 he was given a cavalry 
command in Asia Minor and in 1923 he was dismissed again 
this time for aiding the Leonardopoulos-Gargalidis coup. He 
was readmitted in 1927 by the «Ikoumeniki» government and 
worked quietly for the restoration of the King. In 1935 with 
Admiral Ikonomou and the Air Force General Repas, he pres­
sed Tsaldaris to resign, thus assisting Kondylis to assume 
power.
Papanastasiou, Alexandras (1878-1936). Having studied politi­
cal economy and philosophy in Berlin, Papanastasiou on his 
return to Athens founded the group of «Sociologists». Cham­
pion of land reform in Thessaly. Elected deputy, 1910, and 
joined the Liberal party with his radical followers. 1917-1920, 
Minister of Communications and other posts. 1922, he was 
imprisoned after issuing the «Republican Manifesto». Left the 
Liberal party to found the Republican Union (Dimokratiki 
Enosis). In 1924, as Prime Minister, he proclaimed the Repub­
lic. The intellectual leader of the liberal Republican wing in 
Greek politics.
Papoulas, Anastasius (1887-1935). Promoted from the ranks. 
1904, secret government mission to Macedonia. 1912-13, 
commanding officer 10th Infantry Regiment in Epirus and 
Macedonia. 1917, tried for treason and imprisoned in Crete. 
November 1920, released, promoted Lt. General, Commander 
in Chief of the Greek Army in Asia Minor. Resigned May 
1922. November 1922, key witness at the trial of the Six. 
Thereafter switched sympathy from the anti-Venizelist to the 
Venizelist cause. 24 April 1935, executed for alleged involve­
ment in the coup of 1935.
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Plastiras, Nikolaus (1883-1953). Professional soldier turned 
politician. After serving in the Balkan Wars and N. Epirus, 
Plastiras joined the Venizelist movement in 1916, winning 
rapid promotion for distinguished service in Macedonia and 
the Ukraine. As a Colonel and Regimental Commander in 
Asia Minor, he remained in the army at the front after 
November 1920, despite his known Venizelist loyalties. 
Leader of the revolution of September 1922, Plastiras pursued 
thereafter an active political and revolutionary career until his 
death.
Saraphis, Stephanos (1890-1959). Bom in Trikala, Thessaly. 
Graduated from the School for NCOs and fought in the Bal­
kan Wars and on the Macedonian front during World War 1. 
Because of his strong Venizelist sympathies he was put en 
disponibilité after the return of the King in 1920. In 1924 he 
was sent to France to further his military education. He was a 
staff officer of Othonaios and his protégé. He was dismissed 
in 1935 for his role in the abortive Venizelist coup. During the 
German occupation he was the military commander of the 
ELAS resistance forces.
Sophoulis, Themistoclis (1860-1948). Bom in Samos to a prom­
inent family. He studied archaeology in Athens and Germany. 
His political career began in 1900 when he was elected a 
member of the parliament of independent Samos. In 1912 he 
took part in an armed operation to set the island free from the 
last vestiges of Turkish influence. He participated in the revolt 
of 1916 on the side of Venizelos and became the Minister of 
Interior in the government of Thessaloniki. In 1917 he became 
President of Parliament and in 1924 headed a government that 
lasted for three months. He assumed the position of President 
of Parliament between 1926 and 1928 and became Minister of 
Army Affairs in Venizelos’ government of 1928. After the 
latter’s death, he assumed the leadership of the Liberal party.
Spais, Leonidas (1892- ). Bom in Arta, Epirus into a land­
owning family. His original plan was to emigrate to the United 
States but having to complete his army service he volunteered 
in 1912 and served as a sergeant in the infantry. He rose from 
the ranks during the Balkan Wars and was given a regular 
commission in 1914. In 1916 he joined Venizelos in the Thes­
saloniki revolt. He was active in most military conspiracies 
between 1922 and 1935. He was dismissed in 1932 and was 
imprisoned after the abortive coup of 1935.
Tsaldaris, Panagis (1868-1936). Bom in Corinth, studied law in 
Athens, Berlin and Paris. He was Minister of Justice in the 
Gounaris cabinet of February 1915 and was later exiled for his 
Royalist stand. He became a Minister of Interior in the Rallis 
government of November 1920. After the execution of 
Gounaris in 1922 he became the de facto leader of the anti- 
Venizelist Populist party. In 1927 he was a Minister of Interior 
in the «Ikoumeniki» government and became Prime Minister 
in 1932. His moderate position found him at odds both with 
the Venizelist and Royalist extremists.
Tsigantes (Svoronos), Christodoulos (1897-1971). Born in 
Rumania. Graduated from the Military Academy in 1916 and 
furthered his studies in Paris. He was promoted very quickly 
to the rank of Major (1923) but remained in that rank for 
many years. A friend of Pangalos, he was assigned to a posi­
tion in Corfu after the latter’s fall. His brother Ioannis in­
itiated him into the organisation of the coup of 1935 which 
cost him his position in the army. He was reinstated by the 
Greek government in exile during World War 11.
Tsimicalis, Efthymios (1879-1943). Born in Agrinion. 
Graduated from the Military Academy in 1900. He went to 
France for graduate military studies and became a Captain 
during the Balkan Wars. As a member of the «National 
Defence» of Thessaloniki, he commanded the Cretan Division. 
He was given important commands during the Republican 
period. He held a Ministry in the government of the Generals 
in 1933 and in 1935 he was in charge of the 2nd Army Inspec­
tion. He was retired after the coup of 1935 although he played 
no part in it.
Venizelos, Eleftherios (1864-1936). Entered Cretan politics in 1889 
and became a leading figure in the revolutionary movement for 
unification with Greece. His opposition to Prince George, High 
Commissioner of Crete, won him a national reputation. From the 
moment he arrived in Greece in 1910, at the invitation of the 
«Military League» of the Goudi revolutionaries, until his death in 
exile in 1936, he dominated Greek politics. Founder and leader of 
the Liberal party which became the starting point of many distin- 
guised political figures (Kaphandaris, Papanastasiou, Michala- 
kopoulos, Sophoulis, Papandreou, Mylonas, S. Venizelos).
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